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1. Introduction
An important impulse for the development of an ‘‘internal labor market’’
(ILM) literature within the labor economics literature was Doeringer and
Piore’s (1971) seminal work. They emphasized the institutional character of
employment relationships arguing that administrative rules and procedures,
i.e. personnel policies, govern employment relationships, which result in
outcomes concerning the pricing and allocation of labor that contrast
sharply with the predictions of traditional labor economics. Part of this
ILM literature has been devoted to study the design and eﬀects of such
personnel policies (e.g., Prendergast 1993; Prendergast and Topel 1996;
Milgrom and Roberts 1988), while a substantial body of the theoretical
literature focuses on job ladders, career movements, promotions, and their
relationship to compensation (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981; Rosen 1986;
Waldman 1984; Gibbons and Waldman 1999a; Gibbons and Waldman
2003).1
Although the empirical literature that studies ﬁrm personnel records is
growing, there is still too little empirical evidence derived from personnel
data that record job positions and compensation in ﬁrms on which theories
of the internal workings of ﬁrms can build. Early exceptions include Os-
terman (1979), Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980), and Lazear (1992). The most
detailed empirical study of wage and career dynamics in internal labor
markets so far is Baker et al. (1994a, 1994b) (hereinafter, BGH) who
analyze a yearly panel of personnel data of management employees from a
large U.S. company, which expands over the observation period. Many of
their ﬁndings – including that career paths are important for the allocation
of workers to jobs, that there is a substantial amount of wage variation
within job levels in spite of the strong relation between hierarchical levels
and compensation, and that there is no evidence of distinct ports of entry
and exit as predicted by Doeringer and Piore (1971) – are conﬁrmed by
more recent studies (e.g., Ariga et al. 1999; Seltzer and Merrett 2000; Lima
2000; Gibbs and Hendricks 2001; Treble et al. 2001).
We complement this literature by analyzing ten years of personnel re-
cords from the Dutch aircraft manufacturer Fokker to assess whether these
empirical ‘‘facts’’ are valid for a diﬀerent ﬁrm, in a diﬀerent industry, over
a diﬀerent period, and in a diﬀerent economy. While doing so, we provide
answers to a number of questions that were advocated by Gibbons (1997)
to facilitate the composition of a broader picture of internal labor markets
for which individual studies provide pieces of a puzzle based on ﬁrm-level
data that are often collected in diﬀerent ways and measure diﬀerent
variables.
We shed light on issues that have not been addressed in this literature so
far: Our data set is unique in the empirical literature as it covers an episode of
corporate growth as well as an episode of corporate decline. This enables us
to explore how personnel decisions of the ﬁrm diﬀer between periods of
growth and decline. We investigate the consequences of a changing corporate
environment for promotion dynamics and organizational stability. We can
distinguish between production workers and managers, so that we can
examine whether the internal workings of the ﬁrm diﬀer with respect to
worker type. In addition, we can study whether such diﬀerences exist across
diﬀerent ﬁelds of activity within the ﬁrm, as for instance Production, R&D,
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Sales & Customer Relations, or Administration. Finally, in contrast to
existing studies, which commonly rely on year-end panel data, we analyze
event history data which record the exact timing of all events related to wage
or position changes. The knowledge of the exact timing of all events not only
allows us to explore whether wage and position changes occur simulta-
neously, but it allows us also to look at all events that happen, including those
that would remain hidden between two cross sections of personnel records.
Information that would be lost in yearly cross sections turns out to be sub-
stantial, in particular with respect to temporary worker re-allocation and
downward mobility.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. A major result of our analysis, which
has not received attention in the empirical literature on internal labor
markets, concerns the relation between changes in the size of the work-
force and internal mobility rates. We ﬁnd that promotion rates increase
during corporate expansion and fall during downsizing, while the reverse is
true for demotion rates. The change in job mobility rates is more drastic in
the blue-collar ranks, which account for most of the employment varia-
tion.2 In accordance with the results of BGH, job mobility is substantial in
our ﬁrm and an important determinant of wages. While upward transition
rates are somewhat lower than found for other ﬁrms, we do observe a
substantial number of lateral transitions. This has not been documented in
related studies. Career paths exist that involve lateral job transitions to
more attractive jobs. Wriggling the monkey bars of a ‘‘ﬂat’’ within-job-
level-career path is a prevalent route of career development next to
climbing the job ladder by upward hierarchical job transitions. Job tran-
sitions are the main source for sustained wage growth as wages are
strongly related to job levels. Yet we ﬁnd, like BGH, that wages are not
tied to jobs in a strict sense. Considerable wage spread is found in all job
levels, and wage distributions of adjacent job levels overlap. In addition,
we discover two important novel facts concerning the relation between job
transitions and wage changes that are worth mentioning: First, we detect
that upward job transitions are not always associated with simultaneous
wage raises. Rather, a promotion bonus is frequently awarded some time
after the job change. Usually such ‘‘late’’ raises are given at the end of a
calendar year for promotions that occurred during the calendar year.
Consequently, this eﬀect could not be detected in the previous literature
that commonly studied year-end cross section data. Second, although
downward mobility almost never results in nominal wage cuts – as is also
often reported in the literature cited above – we observe that such a
demotion frequently coincides with degradation in wage scales and hence a
reduced prospect of future wage growth.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the ﬁrm and its
personnel data. Section 3 depicts the hierarchical structure of the ﬁrm and the
procedure used to identify those hierarchical levels. Section 4 analyzes the job
mobility pattern. It portrays entry and exit as well as job transitions within
the ﬁrm. Section 5 examines the relationship between wages and hierarchical
job positions. Section 6 takes a closer look at wage growth and its relation to
job transitions. Section 7 investigates career paths within the ﬁrm and shows
that both careers across hierarchies as well as within hierarchical positions
exists. Section 8 concludes.
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2. The ﬁrm and its personnel data
2.1. The ﬁrm
We have personnel data from the Dutch national aircraft builder N.V.
Fokker over the period from January 1, 1987, when the ﬁrm introduced its
electronic personnel system, until March 15, 1996, when the ﬁrm was oﬃcially
declared bankrupt.3 N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandse Vliegtuigenfabriek Fok-
ker was structured in an administration unit (Fokker Administration B.V.),
an aircraft production unit (Fokker Aircraft B.V.) with plants in three
diﬀerent locations as well as four other subsidiaries at diﬀerent locations (see
Table A.1 in the Appendix). The majority of the workforce was aﬀected by
the bankruptcy of the holding company, the production unit, and the
administration unit, which formed the core business of aircraft manufactur-
ing. The other viable parts of the ﬁrm did not enter the bankruptcy procedure
and were eventually sold. Most of the organizational structure remained
unchanged until the day of the bankruptcy, except for one division, Fokker
Space, that was spun oﬀ in December 1995.4
We analyze the data until the bankruptcy date. This might prompt the
criticism that the ﬁrm is not a representative example of a downsizing ﬁrm as
it fails eventually. This could be problematic if the demise was expected and if
behavior was brought into line with the anticipation of the failure. However,
there is reason to believe that the bankruptcy came suddenly and unexpect-
edly for most of the employees.5
2.2. The data
We use information on each employee’s job, compensation, and demograph-
ics. The job position ﬁle records every worker’s job code, job title,
organization code, organization name, the activity his job belongs to, the
plant name, as well as the starting and end date of all his job positions within
the company during the observation period. The wage ﬁles contain
information on the salary grade, the nominal wage rate, the start and ending
date of the wage contract, the reason for a change in the wage contract, and a
performance measure that refers to performance in the previous year. In
addition, we know the schooling and the vocational degree of most
employees. The ﬁle of demographic characteristics has the date of birth,
gender, marital status, and the hiring date for every employee. We merged
these raw data ﬁles into one event history data ﬁle. Since we know the exact
timing of job changes and wage changes, we can detect whether job changes
and wage changes occur simultaneously. Another advantage of our data
structure is that we do not lose information about events that happen in the
time-span between two cross sections of panel data.
2.3. Development of the workforce
The time period spanned by the data can be divided into a period of
workforce expansion and one of workforce reduction. The number of
employed workers with permanent contracts rises from 10275 in January
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1987 to 12852 at the peak in February 1991. During the subsequent period,
which is marked by a series of reorganizations with employment reductions
and mass layoﬀs, the number of employed workers falls to 7141 on the day
before the bankruptcy.
Figure 1 plots the number of workers employed at the beginning of each
month from January 1987 until March 1996 stacked by ten broad activities
into which jobs are categorized. Most workers are employed in one of the
ﬁve production activities (Assembly (F), Support & Supplies (G), Produc-
tion Preparation (D), Planning & Coordination (E), and Quality (M)).
Employment changes in production activities increasing steadily from 6684
workers in January 1987 to a peak of 8838 workers in June 1991, and then
falling to 4651 workers on the day before the bankruptcy account for the
largest part of the workforce expansion and the subsequent contraction.
Employment in the three administrative activities (Finances and Adminis-
tration (K), Human Resources & Support (H), and Management & Infor-
mation Processing (S)) rises from 1966 workers in January 1987 to 2252
workers in February 1991 and falls subsequently to 1113 workers in March
1996. Employment in R&D (C) and in Sales & Customer Relations (B), on
the other hand, grows for a prolonged period (peaking not until the second
quarter 1993), and declines only moderately until the end of 1995. As a
result, the employment share of production related activities falls during the
episode of downsizing from a peak of 68.8% in mid 1991 to 62.3% in
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Fig. 1. Development and composition of the workforce by activities. Notes: The ﬁgure plots the
number of workers with a permanent contract employed at the beginning of each month from
January 1987 until March 1996 stacked by the different job activities deﬁned in the data. Job
activities comprise: Sales & Customer Relations (B), R&D (C), Management & Information
Processing (S), Human Resources & Support (H), Finances and Administration (K), Support &
Supplies (G), Quality (M), Planning & Coordination (E), Production Preparation (D), and
Assembly (F). Labels are in parentheses. The distance to the next lower line represents the
number of workers in a particular job activity. Total employment at the ﬁrm is, therefore,
characterized by the top line, labelled as ‘‘F’’
Monkey bars and ladders 197
December 1995 and that of administrative activities falls from 17.1% in mid
1991 to 15.9% by the end of 1995.
3. The corporate hierarchy
3.1. Identiﬁcation of levels
We relied on job transitions, job titles, reporting relations and team
composition – but we did not use information from the wage ﬁles – in order
to identify the hierarchical job structure of the ﬁrm. There are 6085 diﬀerent
job codes and 6318 diﬀerent job names in the data.6 Fortunately, the number
of levels could be inferred easily from transitions between a few important job
titles which account for a large portion of the workforce.7 We identiﬁed 10
hierarchical levels. Production workers, supporting workers (e.g., cleaning,
catering, or transportation staﬀ), and lower-level clerical workers are
organized in the bottom three levels. We refer to this group of workers as
blue-collar workers. Higher level clerical workers form level 4 of the
hierarchy. Management and the remaining white-collar workforce are
organized in six management levels (levels 5–10).8 The ‘Executive Board’,
which consisted of a group of 3 managers most of the time, forms the top of
the hierarchy (level 10). Directors of subdivisions and plants are in level 9.
For conﬁdentiality reasons, we lack salary information for those employees in
levels 9 and 10.9 Consequently, analyses involving compensation are only for
the bottom 8 levels of the corporate hierarchy. Moreover, due to the small
number of employees in the top 3 levels, we group these levels together in our
job transition analyses. Level 8 comprises heads of departments. Levels 5, 6,
and 7 comprise managers who report to those in level 8 and head or work in
lower level departments of the ﬁrm. Besides, a large fraction of employees in
levels 4 to 6 are engineers or specialists.
Suggestive job titles conﬁrmed the hierarchical structure inferred from job
transitions. For example, ‘‘Assemblers’’ or ‘‘Lathe Operators’’ are organized
in level 1, whereas team leaders (e.g., a ‘‘Team Leader Assembly’’ or ‘‘Team
Leader Lathe Operation’’) are in level 2, and group chiefs (e.g., ‘‘Group Chief
Assembly’’ or ‘‘Group Chief Lathe Operation’’) in level 3. Similarly, job titles
conﬁrmed our assignment of job codes to higher hierarchical levels. For
example, we observe transitions from ‘‘Specialist’’ to ‘‘Senior Specialist’’, or
from ‘‘Engineer’’ to ‘‘Senior Engineer’’. These suggestive job titles also
facilitated the assignment of minor job codes comprising only one or very few
persons, who sometimes had no transition to or from another job code during
the observation period. Finally, we exploited information about the compo-
sition of teams or subdivisions to assert that the hierarchical structure
inferred from job transitions is consistent with the organization of teams in
the sense that a team leader is assigned to a higher hierarchical level than the
team members reporting to him.
3.2. Structural stability and the size of levels
Table 1 reveals the pyramid structure of the hierarchy with ‘‘sub-pyramids’’
for blue-collar and white-collar job levels. We ﬁnd that many features of this
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hierarchical job structure are remarkably stable over the entire period. The
number of levels in the hierarchy is unchanged and the main job titles in each
level in 1987 remain in the respective levels until the bankruptcy.10
Corresponding with BGH, who report stable relative sizes of hierarchical
levels for an expanding ﬁrm, we also ﬁnd that the relative size of levels is
largely unaﬀected by the workforce expansion from 1987 until 1991 (see
Table 1). However, relative level sizes change markedly during the period of
employment reduction from 1991 until 1996, when the blue-collar share of
total employment (levels 1–3) declines from 75.9% in 1991 to 67.7% in 1995.
4. Mobility
4.1. Entry and Exit
Turnover is comparatively low during the ﬁrst ﬁve years of our observation
period so that we can conﬁdently speak of an internal labor market: The
average annual exit rate equals 7.1% from January 1987 until March 1991,
whereas BGH ﬁnd exit rates of 10% and more when their ﬁrm grows at a
similar rate as ours.
We do not ﬁnd evidence of a completely closed internal labor market.
Entry occurs into all levels in all years as Table 2 shows. Yet, entry is con-
centrated in the bottom levels of blue-collar employment (level 1) and of
white-collar employment (level 4) – especially during the episode of corporate
expansion when 70.3%–76.8% of all beginners, or 85.5%–89.5% of all newly
hired blue-collar workers enter level 1 and when 60.1%–71.1% of all newly
hired white-collar workers enter level 4 (see Table 2). Relative entry rates into
blue-collar ranks are markedly lower during downsizing and entry measured
relative to level size is generally less concentrated in bottom ranks from 1992
onwards, possibly because hiring then takes place to staﬀ vacancies in existing
slots that cannot be ﬁlled from within rather than to hire into slots that are
newly created during expansion.
Hiring and ﬁring takes place at all times. Monthly inﬂow rates are higher
and more erratic (with peaks occurring commonly in May) than outﬂow rates
Table 1. Hierarchical composition, 1987–1996
Level Year
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 51.3 52.9 53.7 54.1 53.0 52.3 50.4 45.2 42.3 43.9
2 16.2 15.6 15.4 14.8 14.6 14.4 14.4 15.6 15.7 16.0
3 9.0 8.6 8.6 7.9 8.3 8.5 8.7 9.2 9.7 9.8
4 11.1 10.9 10.6 11.4 11.9 11.8 12.6 13.4 13.4 12.9
5 6.2 6.0 5.8 5.9 6.2 6.6 7.2 8.3 9.1 8.2
6 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.7 4.0 5.2 6.2 5.6
7 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.9 1.7
8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6
9–10 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: The table shows for each year the percentage of employees in each of the 10 hierarchial job
levels on March 14. Levels 9 and 10 are combined for conﬁdentiality reasons.
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during corporate expansion, while the opposite holds for the episode of
corporate downsizing (see Fig. 2). During early downsizing, in 1991 and 1992,
the workforce reduction is mainly accomplished by a fall in the inﬂow rate,
while the outﬂow rate rises only slightly. The dramatic decline in employment
during 1993–1996, however, is brought about by a substantial increase in the
outﬂow rate and a further drop of the inﬂow rate.11 Remarkable are the
enormous jumps in outﬂow in June 1993, June–August 1994, December 1994,
and December 1995, which follow downsizing announcements in April 1993,
April 1994, and January 1995 respectively.
Table 2. Entry into hierarchical levels, 1987–1996
Level Year
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 76.8 76.6 70.9 70.3 72.0 55.5 24.3 45.2 44.1 45.8
2 6.1 8.5 7.8 6.9 7.1 5.8 15.9 5.5 13.6 12.5
3 2.9 2.9 3.6 5.1 4.1 7.3 11.2 11.0 5.9 8.3
4 10.1 7.3 12.1 12.2 10.8 20.6 19.6 11.0 8.5 8.3
5 2.4 2.6 3.7 4.2 3.8 8.2 15.9 9.6 16.1 0.0
6 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.1 5.6 6.8 6.8 16.7
7 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.6 4.7 4.1 2.5 4.2
8 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.9 4.1 1.7 4.2
9–10 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 1.9 2.7 0.8 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The tables shows for each year the percentage of new hires that entered into the respective
level. Levels 9 and 10 are combined for conﬁdentiality reasons.
Fig. 2. Inﬂow, outﬂow, and employment growth rates. Notes: The ﬁgure plots the monthly hiring
rate, the separation rate, and the net employment growth rates
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Exit rates are highest out of level 1 in the period of downsizing (see
Table 3). Blue-collar workers, particularly those in level 1, separate ﬁrst
during downsizing. Exit rates from level 1 jump most during the 1993
downsizing episode, the ﬁrst with mainly involuntary dismissals (see Table 3).
Higher exit rates out of the bottom level of blue-collar employment can partly
be ascribed to higher turnover rates among workers with short tenure who
predominately entered in level 1 and separate before having made an upward
transition. But even controlling for tenure and other characteristics, Dohmen
and Pfann (2004) ﬁnd that corporate downsizing aﬀects exit rates of blue-
collar and white-collar workers diﬀerently. While job separations are, if
anything, more frequent for white-collar employees than for blue-collar
workers during the period of corporate expansion, workers in the lower ranks
become more likely to separate during downsizing, which is also revealed by
Table 3. It is not until late 1995 that exit rates from the top 5 levels of the
hierarchy increase markedly, which seems to indicate a shift in layoﬀ policy.
4.2. Vertical job mobility
The fact that relative sizes of hierarchical levels remain stable during the
episode of workforce expansion although entry is concentrated in the bottom
levels of blue-collar and white-collar employment while exit rates are similar
across levels suggests that transitions from lower to higher ranks in the
hierarchy abound. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to job transitions to
a higher hierarchical level as promotions and we deﬁne demotions as
transitions to a lower hierarchical job level.12
We record 5704 upward moves and 1627 downward moves over the entire
period which amounts to an average upward (downward) annual mobility
rate of 5.6% (1.6%) over the entire period.13 However, 12652 workers of all
the 17610 workers in our sample make no vertical transition in the hierarchy,
and 7584 of them – who are mostly in level 1 (70.4%) and rarely in levels 7–10
(1.7%) – have the same job code throughout while they are in the sample.
Only 4543 enjoy at least one upward hierarchical transition, and 1536
Table 3. Exit from hierarchical levels, 1987–1996
Level Year
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1 54.0 49.2 64.0 66.1 63.7 63.6 73.4 60.5 42.2 43.0
2 10.9 14.8 11.5 11.9 11.3 10.8 9.7 13.2 18.1 13.8
3 8.8 7.7 4.4 4.4 6.3 6.6 5.0 5.9 7.4 9.5
4 16.1 13.4 10.0 9.3 10.7 8.4 7.3 12.1 15.9 14.7
5 6.4 6.6 3.2 3.7 4.9 5.0 2.1 4.5 7.4 9.0
6 1.7 4.6 3.7 1.5 1.8 2.5 1.6 2.0 5.8 6.3
7 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.3 0.6 1.7 0.4 0.7 1.3 1.8
8 0.6 1.7 1.1 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.7 1.5 1.7
9–10 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The table shows for each year the percentage of separating workers that exit the ﬁrm from
a given level. Levels 9 and 10 are combined for conﬁdentiality reasons.
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workers are demoted at least once, but a large fraction (1121 workers)
belongs to both groups as they experience at least one demotion and one
promotion at diﬀerent times during the observation period.
Upward mobility in our ﬁrm is lower than in organizations analyzed in
related studies, despite the fact that these studies are commonly based on
year-end data and, therefore, miss oﬀsetting vertical moves of stayers as well
as all job changes of separating workers that take place during the year. The
fact that related studies commonly consider only white-collar jobs partly
explains why upward mobility is lower in our ﬁrm as a whole: Job transition
rates for white-collar workers are also higher in our ﬁrm in both periods. The
average annual promotion (demotion) rate for white-collar workers is 7.7%
(2.7%) during expansion and 6.4% (2.6%) during contraction, but 6.4%
(1.0%) during expansion and 3.9% (1.4%) during downsizing for blue-collar
workers.
Demotions are more frequent in our ﬁrm than in the ﬁrm studied by
Treble et al. (2001), and much more frequent than in the ﬁrm studied by
BGH, who observe less than 200 demotions in 69840 employee years. In fact,
the prevalence of downward job mobility is much more in line with the
ﬁndings of Seltzer and Merrett (2000). The nature of our event history data
contributes to ﬁnding a substantial number of demotions. Using year-end
data (and including the cross section the day before the bankruptcy as 1996
year-end data), we would miss 27.0% of demotions and 18.7% of promotions.
A substantial number of demoted workers (12.9%) leaves the ﬁrm within a
year after the downgrading. Some of these demotions potentially remain
unobserved when panel data at yearly frequencies are examined. The same
holds for oﬀsetting vertical movements that occur within 365 days (but not
necessarily in the same calendar year). Such temporary reassignments across
job levels, which might either result from correcting previous mis-assignments
or might be due to interim assignments to ﬁll vacant positions temporarily,
account for 21.6% of all demotions. The majority of such demotions oﬀsets
previous promotions. A considerable portion of such oﬀsetting vertical job
moves (45.7%) is accounted for by workers who were promoted during
expansion and demoted during downsizing. This is an interesting result be-
cause Gibbons and Waldman’s (1999a) model of careers in which ﬁrms learn
about employees’ talents and workers accumulate productive skills would
predict that the last workers promoted tend to be the least productive in their
level. Dohmen (2003a) shows that the last workers promoted during an
expansion phase are most likely to be demoted during a subsequent down-
sizing episode.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the vertical job transition pattern for diﬀerent
groups of workers for the sub-periods of workforce expansion and down-
sizing by comparing their hierarchical position at the beginning of the period
to that at the end.14 The tables are divided into four blocks. The upper two
blocks contain transition patterns of workers who were employed at the
beginning of the period as shares of incumbent workers, while the lower two
describe transition patterns of all new entrants during the period as shares of
new entrants at given entry levels during the respective period. The rows of
the blocks depict what shares of workers assigned to a given level at the
beginning of the period (upper blocks) – or the beginning of the employment
relation for new entrants (lower blocks) – are employed in diﬀerent levels at
the end of the period (left blocks) and what shares left after having reached a
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particular level (right blocks). For example, in the ﬁrst period, 65.1% of all
workers who were employed at level 1 on January 1, 1987, are still employed
at level 1 on March 1, 1991; 11.1% have proceeded to level 2, 2.6% to level 3,
and 0.6% to level 4; 20.6% separated during the period and the vast majority
of them had not been promoted. Only 1% of all workers employed at level 1
at the beginning of the period had been promoted prior to their separation.
A comparison of Tables 4 and 5 reveals important facts: Firstly, a larger
fraction of workers who separate in the second period had progressed to
higher levels before their employment relation ends. Secondly, upward
mobility is lower in the period of downsizing so that substantially fewer
workers staying with the ﬁrm are promoted to higher levels. An obvious
explanation is that less slots become vacant in higher positions when the
company reduces employment, especially as the employment reduction is not
proportional to level size. That many workers who were promoted during
downsizing separate also suggests that ‘‘talented’’ workers leave the ﬁrm,
possibly because of reduced further career prospects in a downsizing ﬁrm.
More evidence that promotion rates are inversely related to exit rates comes
from the fact that promotion rates fall the most for blue-collar workers, who
also experience a more severe increase in separation rates. While 14.9% of all
blue-collar workers and 20.0% of white-collar workers move upward in the
hierarchy between January 1987 and March 1991, only 11.6% blue-collar
workers but 21.1% of white-collar workers have proceeded to a higher
hierarchical positions in the longer period between March 1991 and the
bankruptcy or their separation date. Consequently, relative upward mobility
falls for blue-collar worker during downsizing.15
Separating workers have lower upward mobility than remaining workers,
but similar downward mobility in both periods.16 Not correcting for the
length of the employment spell, upward mobility rates are smaller for
beginners than for the incumbent workforce. But workers who enter after
January, 1987, and remain with the ﬁrm have higher upward mobility rates
than entrants who separate before the end of 1991. Tables 4 and 5 also show
that more workers are demoted in the second period and that a substantial
fraction of them leaves. Although the downward mobility rate remains higher
in the upper segment of the hierarchy downward moves become relatively
more common for blue-collar workers.
The mobility pattern indicates interrelations between vertical internal job
mobility and turnover rates. Upward mobility is lower during downsizing and
seems to be related to the scale of workforce reductions (upward mobility falls
the most in blue-collar jobs where exit is concentrated). Downward mobility
is higher during periods of workforce reductions and upward mobility is
positively correlated with entry rates. Fig. 3 plots the entry rate, exit rate,
promotion rate and demotion rate. Not only are promotion rates higher when
entry is high, but promotion rates follow entry rates in the sense that they rise
when entry in the previous months had been unusually high as is evident from
the period from the second half of 1988 until the beginning of downsizing in
1991. Similarly, the demotion rate usually peaks shortly before the exit rate.
Finally we notice that promotion and demotion rates are positively correlated
(correlation coeﬃcient of 0.48). The graph suggests that this result is to some
degree driven by the co-movement of the promotion rate and demotion rate
in periods with severe employment reductions, as is reﬂected in the coinci-
dence of local peaks in both rates in May 1988, January and June 1993,
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January, May and October 1994, and September 1995. This suggests that
such reorganizations trigger reassignments across job levels. The existence of
a relation between changes in the size of the workforce and internal job
mobility rates is an important ﬁnding that deserves more attention in theo-
retical work.17
4.3. Lateral job mobility
We observe a substantial number (13636) of lateral job transitions, which we
deﬁne as changes in job codes of jobs belonging to the same hierarchical level.
This is in sharp contrast to the ﬁndings of BGH, who ﬁnd that only 1.6% of
all job transitions constitute lateral moves. Admittedly, some of the lateral
moves that we observe are spurious job transitions due to the fact that codes
might be changed over time, while the content of the job remains the same.
But the largest fraction of these lateral transitions relates to changes in the job
description. About one fourth of all lateral job transitions involve a transition
to a diﬀerent ﬁeld of activity within the ﬁrm. Table 6 reports for each job level
the shares of lateral transitions that involve a job change to a diﬀerent ﬁeld of
activity.
This suggests an interesting additional dimension in the analysis of job
change, promotion dynamics, and wage dynamics. Lateral transitions might
occur across diﬀerent ﬁelds of activities within the ﬁrm to prepare for sub-
sequent upward mobility thereby increasing career prospects. For instance, an
assembly worker might be assigned to a job in quality control or to a job in
Fig. 3. Monthly mobility. Notes: The ﬁgure plots monthly promotion and demotion rates –
calculated as the number of transitions relative to the number of incumbent workers – along with
the hiring rate and the separation rate from Fig. 2
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production preparation to widen his knowledge on the entire production
process which is crucial in higher level jobs. Such reassignments are usually
referred to as job rotation. If the acquisition of a wider portfolio of skills that
might be required in higher level jobs is the motive, the probability of an
upward move increases for workers who have held diﬀerent jobs at the same
level.18 On the other hand, workers might be transferred laterally because
they do not qualify for upward mobility. Finally, job rotation might be used
to screen workers or learn about their optimal assignment (Ortega 2001), in
which case lateral transitions do not entail a priori information on career
perspectives.19
We assessed the impact of lateral job transitions on future promotion
prospects for workers hired into the bottom hierarchical levels of blue-collar
and white-collar employment (level 1 and level 4 respectively) in the following
way. We constructed two variables that count the number of lateral job
transitions across ﬁelds of activities in the ﬁrst and second year of a new hired
worker’s employment relationship respectively and two variables that likewise
count the number of lateral job transitions within a given ﬁeld of activity
during the ﬁrst two years of tenure with the ﬁrm. In separate probit regression
models for blue-collar and white-collar workers, we then estimated the eﬀect
of these four variables on the probability of being promoted to a higher
hierarchical level during the third year of the employment relationship given
that no such promotion had occurred during the ﬁrst two years.20 The results
indicate that lateral job mobility has a positive impact on promotion pros-
pects for blue-collar workers, but not for white-collar workers. In fact, all
coeﬃcient estimates are insigniﬁcant for white-collar workers and only one
has a positive sign. In contrast, all coeﬃcient estimates are positive for blue-
collar workers and lateral job transitions to a diﬀerent ﬁeld of activity have a
statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on a blue-collar worker’s probability of
being promoted two years later. Yet, the eﬀect of such a lateral job transition
is rather small: The estimated marginal eﬀect evaluated at the mean of the
explanatory variables is 0.024 such that one lateral transition to a diﬀerent
job activity in the ﬁrst year increases a blue-collar worker’s chance of being
promoted in his third year by 2.4%.21
Hence, our results for blue-collar workers provide some weak evidence
that obtaining a wider portfolio of skills by switching laterally to a diﬀerent
job activity improves promotion prospects. In spite of ﬁnding mostly insig-
niﬁcant eﬀects of lateral transitions on the chances of promotion in the very
near future we should not jump to the conclusion that lateral job transitions
are not advantageous because a lateral transition might entail a career step in
itself, both in terms of wage growth and in terms of job characteristics. We
Table 6. Lateral job transitions to a different ﬁeld of activity
Job level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9–10
Number 1515 426 336 525 227 159 62 83 19
% 23.1 23.1 30.1 26.4 22.1 23.6 32.0 40.3 46.3
Notes. This table reports for each job level the absolute number of lateral job transitions that
involve a job change to a different ﬁeld of activity (row 2) and their percentage share (row 3) of all
lateral transitions at the respective level. Levels 9 and 10 are combined for conﬁdentiality reasons.
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will return to this possibility in Sect. 6.3, where we analyze the relation be-
tween lateral job mobility and wage growth, and in Sect. 7.3, where we
provide some evidence on career paths that involve lateral job transitions.
Furthermore, it should be noted that there is evidence that a fraction of
lateral reassignments lasts only for a short time – 31% of all lateral move-
ments are not observed in a year-end panels. This possibly results from
temporarily staﬃng of crucial vacancies, from intended job rotation in order
to learn about a worker’s performance at diﬀerent jobs or to stimulate the
accumulation of diﬀerent skills, or from correcting ‘mistakes’ in assignment,
when an intended lateral move turns out to have resulted in an ineﬃcient
allocation.
5. Wages and the hierarchy
Since internal labor markets are characterized by substantial ﬁxed costs of
hiring, screening, or training, which become sunk upon a separation, internal
labor markets foster long-term relations between workers and the ﬁrm.
Wages no longer have to equal marginal productivity at every moment during
the employment relation in presence of such ﬁxed costs, even with competitive
labor markets (see Oi 1962). Although external labor market conditions
potentially constrain the internal wage structure, for example, by aﬀecting
hiring wages, competitive forces do not restrict wage determination to a
unique outcome in internal labor markets. Exploiting this indeterminacy of
wages, the ﬁrm can design the wage structure to encourage long-term
relations, shield workers from external conditions or accomplish other goals,
as, for example, the provision of incentives to elicit optimal eﬀort levels. We
analyze this wage structure in Sect. 5.2, below.
Doeringer and Piore (1971) argue that wages in internal labor markets are
determined by formal, impersonal administrative procedures. Formal rules
and procedures might play an important role in wage determination. Such
rules might improve eﬃciency, for example, by solving hold-up problems,
which arise when wages are set or renegotiated after ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments
(e.g., including ﬁrm-speciﬁc training or broadly deﬁned organization-speciﬁc
capital, Prescott and Visscher 1980) have been made. A contractual
arrangement which ﬁxes wages in advance can serve as a commitment device
and help resolve the hold-up problem (MacLeod and Malcomson 1993).
Moreover, the existence of favoritism (Prendergast and Topel 1996) would
give rise to rules in the wage setting process to limit discretion. Consequently,
we should expect the wage structure to be governed by contractual
arrangements and administrative rules.
5.1. Administrative rules in wage setting
The existence of wage scales at our ﬁrm provides evidence for adminis-
trative formal rules in wage setting.22 There are 10 blue-collar scales (scales
2–11) and 8 white-collar scales (scales 12–19). A range of wages exists in
each white-collar wage scale. Minimum, maximum, and mean wages are
increasing in subsequent scales, but wage ranges of subsequent scales
overlap.23
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All blue-collar workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements
(CAO) between unions and employer federations and cover all blue-collar
workers in the ﬁrm.24 The collective bargaining agreement deﬁnes, among
other things, nominal wages for each of the (up to 9) wage grades within all
blue-collar wage scales.25 Firms can pay above these wages, and Fokker
does so. The wage grades can be interpreted as a contractual tenure-wage
proﬁle since workers commonly climb the within-scale wage ladder at dis-
tinct, mostly yearly, intervals. This structure of wage grades and wages
scales is usually not changed in yearly bargaining. Instead, a percentage
nominal wage increase, pertaining to all wages in blue-collar scales, is
negotiated to adjust wages for aggregate conditions (e.g., inﬂation, tech-
nological progress, etc.). Fokker usually adjusts white-collar salaries by the
same percentage, thereby shifting its entire wage frame keeping the wage
structure stable.
As is common in the Netherlands (see Teulings and Hartog 1998), wage
increases can be decomposed into three components: First, a worker is usu-
ally awarded a yearly raise according to the contractual experience-wage or
tenure-wage proﬁles deﬁned in the collective wage agreement until the highest
wage in the scale is achieved. Second, contractual initial increases adjust all
wages to changes in aggregate conditions.26 Third, incidental wage increases
relate to any other type of wage increase including promotions. The latter
type of wage contract changes might occur throughout the year, but the bulk
of wage changes, pertaining to collectively negotiated wage adjustments or
contractual periodical increases take place at the turn of the year and are
usually administered in our data set in the last week of December or the ﬁrst
week of January.
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Fig. 4. Mean wage. Notes: The ﬁgure plots average full-time equivalent nominal wages of
incumbent workers in the hierarchical job levels 1 through 8, which are labelled accordingly. The
thick crossed line reﬂects average full-time equivalent nominal wages at the ﬁrm-level. Means are
calculated based on cross sections taken at the beginning of a year
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5.2. Job levels and wages
The correlation between job levels and salary scales (0.92 in the entire sample,
or 0.68 and 0.81 in the blue-collar and white-collar scales respectively)
indicates a strong relation between wages and jobs. This is conﬁrmed by
Fig. 4 which plots mean nominal full-time equivalent within-job-level wages
over time.27 The vertical wage structure is remarkably stable throughout in
the sense that the magnitude of diﬀerences in average wages between job
levels persists. Only average nominal wages in levels 1 and 4 rise somewhat
faster during downsizing mainly because of the entry and exit patterns that
change the within-level wage distribution. Table 7 illustrates, for example,
that new hires predominately start oﬀ in the lowest decile of the within-level
wage distribution.28 A considerable fraction of separating workers also comes
from the lower deciles of the wage distribution (see Table 8), so that average
within-level wages increase when the hiring rate falls and the separation rate
rises.
Table 7. Distribution of pay for new hires in wage deciles
1987–1991
Level N Decile in job level wage distribution All
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top
1 4270 33.1 20.0 16.9 14.2 7.7 4.2 2.5 0.7 0.6 0.2 100.0
2 405 52.1 22.7 8.4 4.0 2.5 3.7 1.5 1.0 2.2 2.0 100.0
3 212 49.5 9.4 17.9 10.4 4.2 3.3 1.4 0.9 0.9 1.9 100.0
4 602 35.5 18.4 22.8 6.3 4.7 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.3 1.5 100.0
5 189 53.4 9.0 9.5 6.3 2.6 4.2 5.8 0.5 4.2 4.2 100.0
6 45 33.3 13.3 4.4 20.0 6.7 4.4 2.2 2.2 6.7 6.7 100.0
7 24 20.8 25.0 12.5 4.2 0.0 12.5 4.2 16.7 4.2 0.0 100.0
8 12 25.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 8.3 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0
1991–1996
Level N Decile in job level wage distribution All
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top
1 926 58.9 18.3 9.9 5.1 3.6 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.2 0.3 100.0
2 111 35.1 16.2 14.4 7.2 8.1 5.4 4.5 5.4 0.9 2.7 100.0
3 102 58.8 9.8 10.8 6.9 2.0 2.0 2.9 1.0 1.0 4.9 100.0
4 243 43.6 33.3 7.0 3.3 3.3 0.8 1.2 3.7 2.1 1.6 100.0
5 120 76.7 8.3 6.7 3.3 0.0 0.8 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 100.0
6 31 35.5 16.1 6.5 9.7 0.0 0.0 3.2 6.5 6.5 16.1 100.0
7 14 21.4 7.1 14.3 7.1 0.0 14.3 7.1 0.0 0.0 28.6 100.0
8 9 11.1 0.0 22.2 0.0 11.1 0.0 22.2 0.0 22.2 11.1 100.0
Notes: The two blocks of the table show for the periods from January 1, 1987, until March 1,
1991 (upper block), and from March 1, 1991, until March 14, 1996 (lower block), the number of
entrants into each level (column 2). Columns 3–12 of the blocks show the percentage shares of
workers entering in a given job level whose starting wage is in a particular decile of the respective
job level wage distribution. Wage distributions are based on hourly wages for all workers
employed in the relevant job level and period and are calculated on the dates following contract
wage adjustments due to inﬂation compensation and (semi-)annual raise. For privacy reasons,
there is no salary information for levels 9 and 10 in the personnel ﬁles.
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Such changes in within-level wage distributions explain why average
nominal job level wages – especially in levels 1 and 4 (see Fig. 4) where exit is
concentrated and hiring falls the most – rise after 1993 although it was agreed
in collective bargaining not to adjust wage scales at the ﬁrm for inﬂation
because of the ﬁrm’s depressed economic condition. Such inﬂation correc-
tions remained eventually set out until January 1, 1996, when they were made
up for. However, the rise in average ﬁrm-level wages can be mainly attributed
to the rise in the employment share in higher hierarchical levels resulting from
the relative lower separation rates of high-wage workers discussed in Sect. 4.1.
Separating workers are more evenly distributed over the wage distribution
than new hires (compare Tables 7 and 8). A substantial fraction of workers
moves up in the job-level wage distribution before separating. This provokes
the question of how big the spread in job-level wage distributions is, i.e., how
much wage growth is associated with moving up a decile in the job-level wage
distribution. Kernel density estimates of the within-level wage distributions in
Fig. 5 reveal substantial wage variation. The wage distributions in the ﬁgure
Table 8. Distribution of pay for separating workers in wage deciles
1987–1991
Level N Decile in job level wage distribution All
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top
1 1835 11.0 15.5 15.9 11.9 11.1 10.1 6.7 6.0 5.4 6.4 100.0
2 376 19.4 12.5 10.1 6.9 6.6 4.5 8.5 7.7 9.3 14.4 100.0
3 202 17.8 10.9 6.9 6.9 4.0 6.9 5.0 8.9 13.4 19.3 100.0
4 356 17.1 10.7 9.8 7.0 7.9 5.9 10.7 8.7 5.6 16.6 100.0
5 172 16.3 8.1 8.1 10.5 12.2 5.2 7.0 4.1 14.0 14.5 100.0
6 92 15.2 12.0 12.0 8.7 7.6 9.8 6.5 7.6 5.4 15.2 100.0
7 42 9.5 11.9 7.1 4.8 7.1 9.5 9.5 7.1 9.5 23.8 100.0
8 31 3.2 3.2 3.2 12.9 3.2 6.5 19.4 6.5 25.8 16.1 100.0
1991–1996
Level N Decile in job level wage distribution All
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top
1 4271 16.1 13.6 13.0 11.9 10.0 8.7 7.0 4.6 8.2 7.0 100.0
2 865 13.8 11.4 10.8 9.7 7.3 8.6 9.8 6.0 9.2 13.4 100.0
3 484 14.5 11.0 8.1 8.7 9.3 3.1 10.5 14.0 5.6 15.3 100.0
4 765 12.9 13.5 10.6 8.5 7.2 6.1 10.7 8.8 3.8 17.9 100.0
5 502 14.1 13.3 10.0 8.0 11.2 8.4 6.0 2.2 15.9 11.0 100.0
6 287 11.5 12.2 8.7 11.5 7.7 1.0 10.5 9.8 10.5 16.7 100.0
7 92 12.0 10.9 12.0 3.3 20.7 5.4 6.5 1.1 7.6 20.7 100.0
18 66 7.6 10.6 6.1 6.1 12.1 6.1 13.6 3.0 28.8 6.1 100.0
Notes: The two blocks of the table show for the periods from January 1, 1987, until March 1,
1991 (upper block), and from March 1, 1991, until March 14, 1996 (lower block), the number of
exists from each level (column 2). Columns 3–12 of the blocks show the percentage shares of
workers existing from a given job level whose ﬁnal wage is in a particular decile of the respective
job level wage distribution. Wage distributions are based on hourly wages for all workers
employed in the relevant job level and period and are calculated on the dates following contract
wage adjustments due to inﬂation compensation and (semi-)annual raises. Only the ﬁrst accession
to the ﬁrm of a worker is considered, so that re-hiring is neglected. For privacy reasons, there are
no salary information for levels 9 and 10 in the personnel ﬁles.
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refer to 1991, but their main features are the same in all years29: Wages rise on
average with job-levels, but wage distributions of successive hierarchical levels
overlap. Wages are deﬁnitely related to job levels as the correlation between
job levels and wage scales already suggested, but wages are not tied to jobs in
a strict sense as substantial within-job-level wage variation remains. These
results are in line with BGH ﬁndings. However, the relation between wages
and hierarchical levels is less convex in our ﬁrm than in the BGH ﬁrm.
Whereas BGH ﬁnd a convex relation even between the logarithm of wages
and job levels, we only ﬁnd a convex relation between the average wage level
and job levels (cf., Table 9).
Tournament models (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981; Rosen 1986) and
hierarchy models (e.g., Calvo and Wellisz 1979; Rosen 1982) predict that
wage diﬀerences between hierarchical levels increase towards the top of the
hierarchy. In hierarchical sorting models (e.g., Rosen 1982), a convex relation
between wages and job levels stems from a scale eﬀect that arises because
more talented workers are assigned to higher hierarchical positions, where
their decisions raise the productivity of all subordinated workers. The
sequential tournament model (Rosen 1986), in which workers compete for
sequential promotions along a corporate job ladder, also predicts a convex
relation between wages and job levels because the inter-job-level wage spread
jumps at the top of the hierarchy when there is no option value of additional
future promotions. At lower levels, part of the winner’s prize includes the
possibility to compete for even larger prizes. Unfortunately, we do not
observe wages for workers in the two top levels. How convex the relation
between wages and job levels is, and whether there is even a convex relation
Fig. 5. Wage spread by job levels in 1991. Notes: The ﬁgure plots kernel density estimates of the
within job-level distribution of hourly full-time equivalent wages on March 14, 1991. Observed
annual wages are truncated at 200,000 Dutch Guilders. This truncation affects only very few
workers in level 8, but should not bias estimates of the wage distribution in level 8 signiﬁcantly
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between the logarithm of wages and job levels, depends on a number of
factors, including the time horizon of worker careers, discounting, and
especially on the number of contestants at each sequence as well as the degree
of risk aversion of participants. If workers are suﬃciently risk averse, an
incentive-maintaining prize structure requires a weakly convex relation
between the logarithm of wages and job levels. However, we do not ﬁnd that
inter-level percentage wage diﬀerences increase towards the top of the hier-
archy – in contrast, percentage wage diﬀerences between levels even narrow
towards the top of the blue-collar ranks (see Table 9). Since we cannot control
for risk aversion of workers and other relevant factors, it is diﬃcult to make
decisive statements about the consistency of our observed vertical wage
structure and tournament theory. We sense however, that the wage structure
provides at best only weak evidence for tournaments, not least because
standard tournament models do not predict the substantial amount of within-
level wage variation that we observe.
Wage diﬀerentials for individuals in the same job can result in a model
with deferred compensation (Lazear 1979). But in our ﬁrm, only part of the
within-job-level wage spread is explained by tenure. Gibbons and Waldman
(1999a) propose an alternative explanation for within-job-level wage spread,
which seems to be consistent with our ﬁndings. In their model, workers have
diﬀerent abilities that determine the rate of skill acquisition on the job. As
they improve their productivity, they climb the within-job-level wage ladder.
Firms that learn about their employees’ talents assign a worker to a higher
job level once his expected productivity exceeds a certain threshold value. In
Table 9. Salary premium of promotion
Level 1987–1991 1991–1996
Premium (%) % diﬀ.
means
Premium (%) % diﬀ.
means
Immediate Later Immediate Later
1–2 4.7 (2.4) 2.7 (2.1) 24.4 4.4 (2.7) 2.9 (1.9) 20.4
2–3 4.4 (2.2) 3.1 (2.3) 14.8 4.4 (2.4) 2.9 (1.8) 14.4
3–4 5.4 (4.3) 3.1 (3.0) 10.7 4.9 (3.1) 3.7 (2.4) 12.1
4–5 5.7 (3.1) 3.7 (2.7) 24.6 5.6 (3.5) 3.4 (1.9) 20.6
5–6 5.6 (2.4) 3.2 (2.3) 23.0 6.3 (7.0) 3.4 (2.2) 24.4
6–7 6.5 (4.2) 3.2 (1.9) 22.9 8.4 (10.9) 2.6 (1.9) 21.8
7–8 8.3 (6.9) 1.8 (1.8) 15.9 8.5 (11.4) 2.9 (1.9) 18.5
Total 5.2 (3.3) 3.1 (2.5) 19.5 5.2 (4.9) 3.2 (2.1) 18.9
Notes:
1. The table shows salary premiums as percentage gains relative to the wage before the
promotion. Workers either receive a wage increase on the day of promotion (immediate) or in
the months following the promotion (later).
2. Average premiums are calculated for both groups separately and are reported in the columns
labelled ‘‘immediate’’ and ‘‘later’’. The columns labelled ‘‘% diff. Means’’ reports the
percentage difference between the mean wage of adjacent job levels. Standard deviations are
printed in parentheses below the means.
3. The diﬀerence in level 7 and level 8 mean wages is, of course, an underestimate of the true
diﬀerence since wages of some workers in level 8 are not reported as the distribution of
reported wages is truncated at 200,000 guilders.
4. For privacy reasons, there are no salary information for levels 9 and 10 in the personnel ﬁles.
Monkey bars and ladders 213
an extension of this model, Gibbons and Waldman (2003) introduce worker
heterogeneity in schooling, which allows them to predict overlapping wage
ranges in adjacent job levels. This holds for our ﬁrm as well.
Within-level wage variation generally increases in hierarchical levels.30
Wage distributions for blue-collar job levels have a markedly smaller vari-
ance. This disparity in the pay structure results most likely from more
stringent formal rules in blue-collar wage setting as a consequence of col-
lective bargaining. The higher wage variation for white-collar workers sug-
gests that there is scope for individual negotiation in spite of the formal wage
system.
Still, the existence of pay ranges for jobs indicates that such scope is
limited, certainly for blue-collar workers. For example, 99% of assembly
workers’ wage contracts (the largest job code) are in wage scales 4–8 (95% are
in 5–8). Within that pay range, individual wages depend on experience and
tenure. The tenure-wage proﬁle, however, is again governed by the contrac-
tual wage system. The ﬁrm seems to have some discretion to reward workers
below the top of the within-job pay range with higher wage growth by
awarding more than 1 periodical increase at a time or granting a wage in a
higher wage scale. However, once the highest wage in the job has been
reached, additional wage growth – beyond wage adjustments to aggregate
conditions as ﬁxed in collective bargaining agreements – can only result from
job change.31
6. Wage growth and job transitions
6.1. Wages and promotions
Since wages are positively correlated with hierarchical levels, we expect wages
to rise upon promotion. The large diﬀerence in mean job-level wages unveiled
by Fig. 4 might suggest that promoted workers enjoy substantial wage gains.
On the other hand, Fig. 5 shows that wage distributions of successive levels
overlap so that promotions might not be associated with nominal wage
increases at all. We ﬁnd that wage contracts are changed simultaneously with
upward transitions in 51.6% of the cases. Nominal wages rise in these cases by
an average of 5.2% and these upward job transition are mostly (in 72% of the
cases) associated with climbing at least one wage scale. Wage changes for the
majority of the remaining 48.4% of upward movers occur within 3 months
after the upward job transition.32 However, fewer of them (29.9%) proceed to
a higher wage scale, and their wages grow by less on average (3.1%). Table 9
discloses that average wage increases upon promotions are substantially
lower than the gap between mean wages of successive levels in both periods
and for all levels.33
This observation triggers the conjecture that workers only receive a new
job title in order to grant them additional wage growth when they have
reached the upper range of wages in their current job, which implies that
workers are always promoted out of the top decile of their job-level wage
distribution. Table 10 shows for each level what fraction of workers was
promoted out of a given decile of that level’s wage distribution and how
promoted workers are distributed in the new level’s wage distribution. The
table illustrates that promoted workers were predominantly, but not exclu-
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sively, in the upper deciles of their previous level wage distribution and mostly
earn below median wages in their new job-level. These results are consistent
with the empirical ﬁndings of BGH. In a more detailed analysis than is
documented in Table 10, we ﬁnd that workers promoted out of the bottom
three deciles of their job level wage distribution move predominately to the
lowest decile of the wage distribution in the new job, workers from the 4th
and 5th decile move predominately to the 2nd decile, from the 6th and 7th
decile to the 3rd decile, and from the 8th, 9th, and 10th decile to the 4th, 5th,
and 6th decile respectively. The transitions in the wage distributions of pro-
moted workers are remarkably similar in both periods. We interpret this as
evidence that the principal reason for a vertical job transition is not to merely
grant higher wages but to assign workers to more complex jobs with more
responsibility or span of control.
We ﬁnd evidence that wage growth rates are persistent. For every year, we
calculated the wage growth distribution separately. Workers with wage
growth in the upper (lower) quartile of the wage growth distribution are likely
to be in the upper (lower) quartile in subsequent years. Regression results (cf.,
Table 11) show a positive eﬀect of lagged wage growth on current wage
growth (column 2) even if we control for recent promotions (column 3). This
strong eﬀect disappears if we control for the concavity of the tenure-wage
proﬁle, for individual characteristics, such as age, education and perfor-
mance, and for job characteristics (column 4).34
Again, our results concerning the relation between wages and upward
job transitions do not provide strong support for the tournament model as
described by Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Rosen (1986). Immediate wage
increases upon promotions seem much smaller than tournament theory
would predict (see Table 9). However, the present value of a promotion
substantially exceeds the value associated with the immediate wage gain
Table 10. Distribution of pay for promotees in salary deciles before and after promotions
Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Top All
Level 1 before promotion 2.0 4.0 6.7 9.3 11.5 11.2 10.3 14.3 11.4 19.3 100.0
Level 2 after promotion 27.7 19.7 16.3 12.1 9.9 6.5 3.2 2.5 1.4 0.7 100.0
Level 2 before promotion 3.5 7.3 9.4 8.6 8.9 7.5 9.2 15.2 10.7 19.6 100.0
Level 3 after promotion 18.4 17.8 15.6 18.0 11.6 8.4 4.5 2.6 2.1 1.2 100.0
Level 3 before promotion 7.6 10.7 9.5 10.4 8.3 6.6 9.8 9.0 15.1 13.0 100.0
Level 4 after promotion 10.5 15.4 15.6 17.6 16.6 9.7 7.9 3.6 1.8 1.4 100.0
Level 4 before promotion 3.2 5.5 7.9 8.6 9.4 9.2 9.6 13.5 15.9 17.2 100.0
Level 5 after promotion 17.6 21.4 17.7 16.4 12.3 7.5 2.7 1.6 1.9 1.0 100.0
Level 5 before promotion 2.5 5.6 7.0 10.1 9.9 11.0 14.3 9.3 11.8 18.4 100.0
Level 6 after promotion 29.2 25.3 16.8 8.9 8.1 2.3 3.5 3.1 1.9 1.0 100.0
Level 6 before promotion 3.9 4.6 9.9 9.2 11.8 5.9 11.2 11.8 13.2 18.4 100.0
Level 7 after promotion 36.2 23.7 9.2 7.2 13.2 5.9 0.0 2.6 0.7 1.3 100.0
Level 7 before promotion 1.3 8.8 3.8 8.8 8.8 12.5 10.0 16.3 6.3 23.8 100.0
Level 8 after promotion 16.3 21.3 13.8 7.5 18.8 10.0 7.5 2.5 1.3 1.3 100.0
Notes: ‘The table shows percentage shares of promoted workers’ wages across deciles of the
respective job level wage distribution before and after their promotion. Wage distributions are
based on hourly wages for all workers employed in the relevant job level and period. We
calculated the wage deciles of the current wage distribution on different dates on which the bulk
of wage contracts were adjusted, e.g. because of (semi-)annual inﬂation compensation, during the
period. The Table only summarizes information of workers promoted to the next higher level.
For privacy reasons, there are no salary information for levels 9 and 10 in the personnel ﬁles.
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because the upward transition yields the perspective of additional future
wage growth when the promoted worker moves up towards the new job
level’s wage ceiling. Gibbons and Waldman’s (1999a) model squares much
better with the empirical ﬁndings concerning the relation between wage
dynamics and job transitions, as it predicts that promotions coincide with
relatively high wage growth, but that wages also grow in the new job level
in the years following the promotion. Besides, their model predicts pro-
motion fast-tracks.
This raises the question of whether wage increases predict promotions as
workers who are candidates for higher level positions might already be re-
warded for better than average performance by higher than usual wage in-
creases in their current job. Moreover, if promotion fast tracks (Rosenbaum
Table 12. Promotion and wage growth
Dependent variable: promotion
DlnðW Þt1 0.413 (0.045)* 0.719 (0.062)* )0.101 (0.06)
Promotiont1 )0.088 (0.003)* )0.08 (0.003)*
Controls for individual
characteristics
No No Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 39728 39728 39521
Notes:
1. The dependent variable in all estimations is a binary variable indicating a promotion.
2. DlnðW Þ denotes the log differences of annual hourly wages.
3. Reported coefﬁcients are marginal effects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables.
4. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
5. An asterisk denotes that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
6. Controls for individual characteristics include binary variables for nine education categories,
yearly age dummies, tenure, and binary variables for the six performance evaluation scores.
Table 11. Serial correlation in wage growth
Dependent variable: DlnðW Þ
DlnðW Þt1 0.424 (0.017)* 0.416 (0.017)* )0.013 (0.006)
Promotion 0.033 (0.001)* 0.026 (0.001)*
Promotiont1 )0.001 (0.001) 0.005 (0.000)*
Controls for individual
characteristics
No No Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 75772 75772 75772
R-squared 0.36 0.40 0.61
Notes:
1. The dependent variable in all estimations is the log differences of annual hourly wages
(DlnðW Þ).
2. Reported coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables.
3. Standard errors are in parentheses. An asterisk denotes that the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
4. Controls for individual characteristics include binary variables for nine education categories,
yearly age dummies, tenure, dummies for hierarchical levels, and binary variables for the six
performance evaluation scores.
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1984) exist and if promotions are associated with wage growth (see previous
section), past wage increases should identify career movers and predict future
promotions. In order to test the predictive power of previous wage increases
for a promotion, we estimate probit models in cross sections of the data, in
which promotions are explained by past wage growth, and individual char-
acteristics. The results reported in Table 12 show that past wage growth has a
positive eﬀect on the probability to be promoted (column 2 and 3), but that
this eﬀect works through the impact of individual characteristics on wage
growth, as the direct eﬀect of wage growth on promotion probability disap-
pears if we include controls for tenure, age, education, and performance
evaluation (column 4).
6.2. Wages and demotions
The logic of the previous section, which established that promotions are
associated with nominal (and real) wage growth, suggests wage cuts at
demotions. However, consistent with Bewley’s (1999) ﬁndings, nominal wage
cuts are extremely rare even during downsizing. The ﬁrm might be reluctant
to cut wages because workers perceive a wage cut as unfair and reduce eﬀort
as survey evidence by Blinder and Choi (1990) suggests.35
Only 197 nominal hourly wage rate cuts are recorded, which amounts to
0.1 percent of all wage contract changes.36 Ninety percent of those experi-
encing nominal cuts remain in the same function. Moreover, most nominal
wage cuts (117 out of 197) occur between January 1993 and January 1995
and are concentrated (105 out of 117) at a single plant (ELMO).37 The
absolute number of observed wage cuts would obviously be smaller if we
had data at yearly frequency due to attrition and within-year contract
changes.38
Real wage cuts are more frequent during downsizing. In 1994 and 1995,
33.8% and 42.5 % of employees, respectively, do not receive nominal wage
increases.39 Nominal wages are rarely cut (only 8 out of 1957 times) when a
worker is demoted. This partly results from rules in collective bargaining
agreements which prescribe that the nominal wages of workers demoted to a
lower job level can only be lowered after a period of advance notice which
depends on the worker’s age and tenure. But we observe that demoted
workers are downgraded in the salary scales, which reduces their prospect of
future wage growth.
6.3. Wages and lateral mobility
Wage ranges do not only diﬀer for jobs at diﬀerent hierarchical levels, but
also for diﬀerent jobs at the same hierarchical level. For example, catering
staﬀ, assembly workers and quality controllers are all in level 1, but the wage
range spans scales 3–4 for catering jobs (97% of catering jobs have wages in
that range), scales 4–8 for assembly workers, and scales 5–9 for quality
controllers (95% of quality controllers are in wage scales 5–9). This explains
some of the within-level wage distribution depicted by Fig. 5. But it also
implies that lateral job mobility is a source of wage growth when lateral
transitions to jobs that span higher wage scales eventually lead to climbing the
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wage ladder. Such lateral job transitions associated with upward wage
mobility exist and potentially mark ‘‘ﬂatter’’ career paths.
An inspection of job titles gives rise to the conjecture that certain lateral
job transitions characterize such ‘‘ﬂatter’’ careers since titles of jobs further
down such a ﬂat career path often suggest diﬀerences in qualiﬁcation
requirements or responsibilities. Some apparent examples include movements
from ‘‘Secretary of Department Chef’’ to ‘‘Secretary of the Head of the
Department’’, from ‘‘Assembly Worker’’ to ‘‘Aircraft Mechanic’’, or from
‘‘Assembler Electrical Assembly A’’ to ‘‘Assembler Electrical Assembly B’’.
In all three examples, the lateral transitions are to a job in which the median
wage scale is higher and thus represent a career step for the individual worker.
Such a career pattern is not rate: 45.0% of lateral movements are to jobs with
a higher median wage scale. Only 19.1% are to jobs with a lower median wage
scale.
Lateral job transitions are frequently associated with immediate wage
changes: 21.9% of all lateral job transitions coincide with a wage change on
the same date. Workers climb to a higher wage scale in 42.3% of these cases,
while only 5.5% descend to a lower wage scale. On average, nominal hourly
wages rise by 3.8% when a lateral transition coincides with a wage contract
change. Wage growth is on average lower (2.6%) for workers who have their
wage contract adjusted some time after the lateral job change. Wage growth
associated with a lateral job transition is higher in white-collar job levels than
in blue-collar workers, but there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in average wage
growth of laterally transferred workers between periods of expansion and
contraction.
7. Careers
Careers are a crucial characteristic of internal labor markets. According to
the theory of internal labor markets careers help foster long-term employ-
ment relations and shield workers from external labor market conditions.
This is desirable if ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is important. We investigate whether
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is important in our ﬁrm by assessing whether workers
who are hired into a job level from outside diﬀer in their characteristics
from workers who are promoted to the same level from within. Then we
describe job ladders that involve vertical job transitions and ‘‘ﬂatter’’ career
paths that consist of lateral job transitions in more detail. Especially for the
latter type of career we ask whether jobs further down the career track are
more attractive, both in terms of wages and the amount of shielding from
external conditions.
7.1. New hires versus incumbents
To shed light on the question of whether speciﬁc-capital is important in our
ﬁrm, we compare age and education levels of new hires to a given level and
workers promoted from inside to the same level. Table 13 shows that new
hires into levels 2–5 are on average 4.5 to 7 years younger than incumbent
workers who have been promoted to the same hierarchical level. Age
diﬀerences are smaller in higher levels and almost negligible in levels 7 and 8.
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The pattern does not diﬀer between periods. The two right-most columns
show that promoted workers have on average been employed for 7 to 12 years
in the ﬁrm.40 If ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is important in the ﬁrm, promoted
workers should have accumulated sizable levels of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital during
their elapsed tenure and new hires should compensate by either having more
experience—which is unlikely given that they are substantially younger on
average—or higher levels of education. Table 14 reveals that new hires indeed
hold higher levels of general and vocational schooling degrees than promoted
incumbent workers. So new hires seem to make up for lower levels of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc capital with higher levels of general capital.
7.2. Job ladders across hierarchical levels
An important characteristic of our ﬁrm is the existence of diﬀerent career
paths, which sometimes span a number hierarchical levels. Vertical career
paths commonly connect a number of jobs on diﬀerent hierarchical levels
within a particular ﬁeld of activity. Yet, the set of hierarchical levels that is
covered by a typical career diﬀers across the various ﬁelds of activities, so that
there are ‘‘pyramids within the hierarchical pyramid’’. For example, 97.8% of
all workers in ‘‘Assembly’’ (F) are in the blue-collar ranks (levels 1–3). This
might be contrasted with ‘‘Sales’’ where 85% of the employees are in
management levels.
Two classes of career tracks can be identiﬁed in the white-collar ranks of
‘‘R&D’’. The ﬁrst class embraces a classical engineering career which involves
concentration on technical aspects and specialization therein. Such a career
path typically spans levels 4–6.41 Workers on an engineering career track
typically start as ‘‘Staﬀ Member of Engineering’’ on level 4, then they may
become a ‘‘Specialist’’ or ‘‘Engineer’’ on level 5, and eventually they may be
promoted to ‘‘Lead Engineer’’ or ‘‘Senior Specialist’’ (commonly in aircraft
design) on level 6. The second class contains management careers in which
Table 13. Age and tenure: New hires versus promoted incumbents
Level Age Tenure
1987–1991 1991–1996 1987–1991 1991–1996
Entree Promotee Entree Promotee Promotee
1 24.5 (6.8) 25.2 (6.6)
2 26.4 (6.4) 30.3 (7.2) 28.2 (6.8) 31.3 (7.1) 7.2 (6.7) 8.3 (6.9)
3 27.8 (6.0) 35.0 (8.2) 28.4 (7.4) 34.9 (7.2) 11.1 (9.1) 11.8 (8.4)
4 27.5 (4.8) 35.4 (8.6) 26.7 (4.9) 34.9 (7.2) 10.5 (9.6) 10.6 (8.8)
5 30.6 (6.7) 34.4 (7.2) 28.1 (4.4) 34.7 (6.8) 8.5 (8.0) 8.3 (7.4)
6 33.5 (6.2) 38.1 (7.5) 35.1 (8.7) 36.9 (6.4) 10.8 (8.5) 10.4 (8.0)
7 39.3 (6.6) 39.1 (6.1) 39.3 (6.1) 39.8 (6.1) 11.2 (6.8) 11.8 (7.6)
8 44.6 (6.3) 42.5 (7.1) 40.9 (7.2) 41.4 (5.4) 14.0 (9.7) 13.0 (7.0)
Notes: The table compares entry ages and ﬁrm tenure of promoted incumbents and workers
hired into the same level for the episodes of workforce expansion (1987–1991) and workforce
contraction 1991–1996). Columns 2–5 show the mean ages of workers respective levels and
provide standard deviations in parentheses below the respective means. Columns 6–7 report ﬁrm
tenure of promoted workers. When judging the magnitude of the standard deviations, it should be
taken into account that the age and tenure distributions are very skewed.
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workers concentrate on supervision and handling of the day-to-day business.
Positions in a management career track include ‘‘Design Division Leader’’ on
level 4, ‘‘Project Leader’’ or ‘‘Chief of Engineering Group’’ on level 5, and
‘‘Head of Division’’ on level 6. It should be mentioned that career tracks
comprising lower ranks also exist in R&D. About 16% are employed in these
ranks, working predominately as design engineers.
On a prevalent career path in ‘‘Sales & Customer Relations’’ an employee
starts on level 4 as an ‘‘Aircraft Analyst’’ or ‘‘Account Manager’’ and may
eventually become an ‘‘Area Manager’’ or ‘‘Area Sales Manager’’ on level 8.
Table 14. Education level: New hires versus promoted incumbents
1987–1991
Job Level Education level
lo lbo mavo llw havo mbo vwo hbo uni
2 Promotees 0.6 15.5 8.8 36.0 4.6 27.8 2.7 3.5 0.5
Entrees 0.0 4.1 8.8 5.0 9.1 42.0 6.3 20.8 3.8
3 Promotees 0.5 7.4 4.2 19.3 3.2 45.4 5.2 13.1 1.7
Entrees 0.0 0.6 5.4 2.4 4.2 16.7 6.5 44.0 20.2
4 Promotees 0.0 4.8 6.3 7.2 1.5 31.9 5.4 34.3 8.7
Entrees 0.0 0.2 1.2 0.4 3.3 2.7 14.7 39.0 38.4
5 Promotees 0.0 1.2 5.2 2.5 3.1 9.3 5.9 44.8 28.1
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 1.3 1.3 17.0 19.0 60.8
6 Promotees 0.0 1.1 3.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 6.1 35.4 50.3
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 3.2 22.6 22.6 48.4
7 Promotees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 4.8 6.5 33.9 51.6
Entrees 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.6 31.8 50.0
8 Promotees 0.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0 60.0
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0
1991–1996
Job Level Education level
lo lbo mavo llw havo mbo vwo hbo uni
2 Promotees 0.4 10.4 10.9 33.0 4.9 35.4 2.1 2.7 0.2
Entrees 0.0 0.0 8.3 1.7 5.0 43.3 13.3 20.0 8.3
3 Promotees 0.7 5.8 5.1 20.7 5.1 49.5 0.4 10.5 2.2
Entrees 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.8 8.9 14.3 55.4 17.9
4 Promotees 0.0 5.0 3.1 10.0 4.6 36.4 2.3 28.7 10.0
Entrees 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 2.3 6.3 13.1 43.8 33.5
5 Promotees 0.0 1.3 2.5 2.3 1.5 12.4 7.9 44.4 27.7
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.2 13.1 14.3 70.2
6 Promotees 0.0 0.9 3.6 1.4 2.7 6.3 10.8 34.2 40.1
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0 0.0 6.3 31.3 56.3
7 Promotees 0.0 1.4 2.9 0.0 0.0 2.9 7.1 34.3 51.4
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.5 62.5
8 Promotees 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 9.1 9.1 21.2 54.5
Entrees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: The table compares highest obtained schooling degrees of promoted and workers hired
into the same level for the episodes of workforce expansion (1987–1991, upper block) and
workforce contraction 1991–1996, lower block). The cells show the pencentages of promotees or
entrants with a given schooling degrees so that rows sum to 100.
Education levels are deﬁned in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
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This career track involves transitions to ‘‘Market Development Engineer’’
(level 5), ‘‘Account Development Manager’’ (level 6), and ‘‘Sales Manager’’
(level 7). Career tracks in lower levels also exist and are predominately fol-
lowed by high-ranked blue-collar workers who transfer from production re-
lated activities. In particular, ‘‘Basic Instrument Experts’’ (level 2 in
production) are promoted to ‘‘Instructors’’ (level 3) in ‘‘Sales & Customer
Relations’’ and may then proceed to become a ‘‘Technical Representative’’ on
level 4. (We also observe inﬂow into this job from production workers on
level 3.) Workers on this career track proceed to ‘‘Resident Technical Rep-
resentative’’, but most careers that we observe end there. Only one person
goes on to level 6 as ‘‘Customer Support Manager’’. Two persons make
further careers by entering diﬀerent jobs after having been a ‘‘Technical
Representative’’. In general, we ﬁnd that relatively fewer workers are hired
from outside into positions further down a particular career path.
In addition, a substantial fraction of the inﬂow into career paths in
‘‘R&D’’ and ‘‘Sales & Customer Relations’’ has experience elsewhere in the
ﬁrm. Only 35.2% of workers who enter ‘‘Sales & Customer Relations’’ from
January 1987 until March 1991 are hired from outside. Those who enter from
within the ﬁrm come predominately from ‘‘R&D’’. Similarly, only 56.2% of
new entrants into ‘‘R&D’’ are new hires. Workers who transfer from other
activities within the ﬁrm come predominately production activities (73.6%).
This ﬁnding underpins the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge, e.g.,
expertise and acquaintance with the ﬁrm’s sophisticated product. The degree
to which such ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge is important varies between diﬀerent
activities as one would expect. There is substantially less inﬂow from within
relative to inﬂow from outside in administrative activities (K, H, S). Between
1987 and 1991, when all non-production activities of the ﬁrm (Administrative
activities (K, H, S), R&D (C), and Sales & Customer Relations (B)) grew at a
similar rates (see Fig. 1), 64.5% of all new entrants into administrative
activities were recruited from outside.
An examination of job transitions across the ﬁve activities within pro-
duction (Assembly (F), Support & Supplies (G), Production Preparation (D),
Planning & Coordination (E), and Quality (M)) supports the conjecture that
careers are important because some jobs build on expertise acquired in other
jobs within the ﬁrm. A disproportionately large share of all workers who are
hired into production activities during the expansion enters into ‘‘Assembly’’
(3062 of 4184). Only 309 workers enter ‘‘Assembly’’ from a job elsewhere in
the ﬁrm, and only 140 of them enter into a job on level 1, where more than
80% of workers in this activity are employed. During the same period, sub-
stantially more workers (818) leave ‘‘Assembly’’ for jobs in other activities
within the ﬁrm—mostly jobs in one of the other 4 production related activities
(578).
In contrast, 362 workers are hired into ‘‘Production Preparation’’, but
651 are transferred from within (267 of whom come from Assembly).
‘‘Quality’’ is the activity where hiring from outside (122) relative to transfers
from within (327) is lowest. Most of the workers (208) who enter ‘‘Quality’’
worked in ‘‘Assembly’’ before and remain on the same job level (189). But
they usually climb a wage scale upon the transition. Hence, these lateral
transitions reﬂect careers within a job level. Other examples of such career
monkey bars are discussed in the next section. It is noteworthy that 28.8%
of all job changes – and 24.5% of lateral job changes – involve transitions
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to diﬀerent ﬁelds of activity. Job transitions across diﬀerent activities within
the ﬁrm are more concentrated at the lower rungs of a career ladder and
diminish further down a career track, implying that career decisions are for
the large part taken early on, and career changes become rarer later in the
employment relation.
7.3. Monkey bars within hierarchical levels
Careers within hierarchical levels are important. In fact, wriggling the
monkey bars of a within-job-level-career is a more common phenomenon
than climbing the career ladder by upward hierarchical job transitions. As
already mentioned, examples include transitions from assembly workers to
quality controllers, but also exist within more narrowly deﬁned ﬁelds of
activities. One particular, but typical, example is the transition from
‘‘Assembler Electrical Assembly A’’ to ‘‘Assembler Electrical Assembly B’’
which commonly does not result in an immediate advancement in wage
scales, but does so eventually as the median wage scale is higher for the
latter job. Roughly two thirds of lateral movements are transitions to jobs
with a higher mean wage scale.42 More interesting, we observe 251
transitions from the ﬁrst to the latter job, but only one worker is hired
from outside to the latter job during the entire observation period. Jobs
towards the higher end of within-job career tracks are less frequently ﬁlled
from outside.
Within-job-level-careers are also common for secretaries.43 Lateral career
movements frequently involve a transition from ‘‘Secretary of Section Chief’’
to ‘‘Secretary of Department Head’’. Again, we ﬁnd that positions further
down the career path, e.g., positions for ‘‘Secretary of Department Head’’ are
more frequently ﬁlled by job transitions from within than by external hiring.
However, entry from outside into positions further down the career path is
more common for secretarial jobs than for jobs in, for example, ‘‘Production
Preparation’’ or ‘‘Quality’’. An obvious explanation is the greater importance
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge in the latter job activities.
Two generally important features of careers in our ﬁrm can be illus-
trated with the help of the ‘secretary example’: Firstly, lateral job transi-
tions often represent an advancement on a ‘‘ﬂatter’’ career track as they are
to jobs that are better paid and less exposed to competition from outside.
Secondly, lateral movements are sometimes stepping stones for upward
transitions either within the vertical secretarial career path – secretaries can
move upward to become ‘‘Secretary of Director’’ and further to become
‘‘Secretary of Executive Board Member’’ – or to other career paths within
the ﬁrm – we also observe transitions to supervisory jobs (mostly in data
processing), to higher-level administrative jobs, and eventually to lower
level management jobs (mostly with tasks related to human resource
management).
8. Conclusion
Our analysis conﬁrms the existence of an internal labor market and the
importance of lateral and vertical job mobility therein. Since wages are
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related to job levels, transitions are material for workers’ wage growth.
Although immediate gains upon promotions are small – often job transitions
and wage changes do not even coincide – compared to the average diﬀerence
in wages for adjacent job levels, promoted workers can look forward to a
period of sustained wage growth as they move up in their new job level’s wage
distribution. The spread of these job-level wage distributions is substantial
and wages in adjacent job levels overlap. In that sense, wages are not strictly
tied to jobs as there remains considerable scope to reward workers based on
individual characteristics.
Lateral job changes are a prevalent phenomenon involving more workers
and more job changes than vertical job transitions. Wriggling the monkey
bars in within-level careers is another valuable means for workers to secure
wage growth. On the one hand, we ﬁnd some evidence that lateral job tran-
sitions across diﬀerent ﬁelds of activity improve future promotion prospects
of blue-collar workers. On the other hand, we detected that lateral job
mobility often represents a career step in itself. Lateral job mobility is on
average associated with immediate wage increases. In addition, lateral tran-
sitions are frequently to jobs with higher median wage scales and thus provide
scope for additional future wage growth within the new job. And ﬁnally,
lateral job transitions are often to jobs that are less frequently ﬁlled by hiring
from outside.
The staﬃng of positions from within is essential for the ﬁrm, especially in
jobs that require ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge. Such organizational or ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital seems crucial in a number of jobs. Workers hired from outside seem to
make up for the lack of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital by having obtained higher
completed schooling degrees than workers promoted from within. Even
though entry occurs at all levels, entry rates are substantially lower in some
career tracks for jobs further down the career path.
Changes in ﬁrm size in general and changes in relative entry and exit
rates have a considerable impact on job transition rates. Promotion rates
fall and demotion rates rise the more the net employment growth rates fall.
The demotion rate for blue-collar workers increases by 40 % during
downsizing. We ﬁnd that demotions are more frequent at our ﬁrm than in
ﬁrms studied in related empirical work. This is partly explained by the fact
that our ﬁrm experiences an episode of employment contraction during
which demotion rates rise. But we also show that we would miss more than
a quarter of all demotions if we only looked at year-end snapshots of the
data as is commonly done in the empirical literature that studies personnel
records of ﬁrms. A substantial number of workers leaves the ﬁrm shortly
after a demotion, and many demotions occur shortly after workers had been
promoted. We believe that these empirical ﬁndings should stimulate further
theoretical work.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrm’s job hierarchy is relatively stable
throughout. The hierarchical job pyramid is neither augmented by job levels
during expansion nor diminished during contraction. However, relative sizes
of job levels change during downsizing when the ﬁrm becomes top-heavy.
This is most likely the result of sizeable diﬀerences in adjustment costs for
diﬀerent workers, particularly when ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is substantial in
jobs further down a career path and future growth is expected as was the
case at our ﬁrm.
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Appendix: Deﬁnition of variables
The following table summarizes the plant locations of the six diﬀerent
subsidiaries. The ﬁrst column deﬁnes the categories that we distinguish in the
paper:
The following table deﬁnes the labels for schooling degrees used in the
paper.
Table A.1. Fokker subsidiaries and plant locations
Location
name
Subsidiary Plant
locations
FAC1 Fokker Administration Amsterdam
FAC1 Fokker Aircraft Schipol
FAC2 Fokker Aircraft Papendrecht/Dordrecht
FAC3 Fokker Aircraft Ypenburg
FSS Fokker Space and Systems Leiden
ELMO Fokker ELMO Woensdrecht
FSP Fokker Special Products Hoogeveen
FAS Fokker Aircraft Services Woensdrecht
Notes: Fokker Administration is located in the city of Amsterdam. In our data, it has the same
location name (FAC1) as the main assembly plant at Schipol, which is due to historical reasons.
Table A.2. Schooling degrees
Education
description
Type of education
lo Basic education
lbo Lower vocational degree
mavo Lower general schooling degree
llw Apprenticeship
havo Intermediate general schooling degree
mbo Intermediate vocational degree
vwo Higher general schooling degree
(qualiﬁes for university enrollment)
hbo Higher vocational degree
uni University degree
Notes: The general schooling degrees, like basic education, lower, intermediate and higher
general schooling degrees are prerequisites for pursuing a given vocational or general education in
the Dutch educational system. Basic education is a prerequisite for any other degree. After having
completed basic education, it is possible to either follow a lower vocational schooling course or to
attend any of the school forms leading to a general schooling degree. Lower general education
(mavo) makes one eligible to follow intermediate vocational training or complete an apprentice-
ship. An intermediate general schooling degree qualiﬁes for higher vocational schooling, a higher
general schooling degree (havo) qualiﬁes for higher vocational schooling (hbo), while the highest
level general schooling degree is a prerequisite for pursuing a college or university degree. In
addition, it is possible to pursue the next higher schooling level after having obtained a given
schooling degree; similarly it is possible to enter the next higher level of vocational schooling after
having completed vocational schooling at the level just below, e.g., after having completed
intermediate vocational schooling one is eligible to enter higher vocational schooling.
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Endnotes
1 See Gibbons and Waldman (1999b) for a recent survey of this literature.
2 Dohmen (2003a) develops a model that generates a dependence relation between job mobility
rates and employment rates.
3 The data were made available to us for academic purposes by the company’s bankruptcy
trustees. The report of the bankruptcy trustees is publicly available (see Deterink et al. 1997).
4 Workers employed at this division leave our data ﬁles on that date.
5 Most analysts expected even in September 1995 that Fokker would survive when the majority
shareholders, the Dutch government and Deutsche Aerospace AG (DASA), started
negotiating a bailout plan. A comment in the Wall-Street Journal on September 4, 1995,
describes the market sentiment: ‘‘Few, however, expect DASA, the aerospace arm of German
industrial giant Daimler-Benz AG, will let Fokker go bust. The Dutch company [...] ﬁlls a key
niche in a market segment expected to show strong growth in the next few years.’’ (du Bois
1995)
6 Some codes correspond to more than one name, which sometimes reﬂects typos, abbreviations
in names, or a change from a Dutch to an English name. On the other hand, some job names
are not unique to a single job code which often reﬂects the fact that codes have changed over
time, while the job itself remained unchanged.
7 The largest 30 job codes comprise 35% of the workforce, and the largest 130 job codes
encompass 50% of the workforce.
8 That we inferred the correct number of levels for white-collar employees from job transitions
is conﬁrmed by additional information on the ﬁrm’s organizational structure of management
which is provided by Deterink et al. (1997).
9 Wages for level 8 employees that exceed 200,000 guilders annually are also not recorded.
10 It is noteworthy, however, that the ﬁrm apparently reorganized certain divisions during
downsizing. For example, diﬀerent engineering jobs are summarized in one job code in 1992.
11 The total number of hirings in the period of downsizing is less than a third of the inﬂow during
expansion. Hiring rates into white-collar ranks fall by less than hiring rates into blue-collar
employment (cf., lower part of Table 3).
12 This deﬁnition squares with additional information about the reason for wage contract
changes. Wage contract changes that coincide with upward job transitions are frequently
coded as a ‘‘promotion’’. Similarly, movements down the hierarchical ladder are often coded
as a ‘‘demotion’’. Since only one reason for a wage-contract change is recorded, contract
changes that involve job transitions but that occur on a date when the bulk of all wage
contracts at the ﬁrm are changed are coded as ‘‘yearly increase’’ or ‘‘price compensation’’.
13 Summing up the length of all employment spells at the ﬁrm from January 1, 1987, until the
date of bankruptcy yields a total of 102,147 employment years.
14 Clearly, this gives only an incomplete picture of total vertical mobility as it ignores oﬀsetting
vertical movements which occur when a worker is promoted and demoted within the period.
15 These percentages are calculated based on the absolute numbers of transitions underlying
Tables 4 and 5, but cannot be readily inferred from the tables 4and 5, as these average
percentages for the fraction of all blue-collar workers and white-collar workers are weighted
by the size of the levels.
16 Note that they have less time for vertical moves.
17 In Dohmen (2003a), corporate expansion triggers a higher promotion rate as hiring
predominately takes place into the lowest hierarchical level while the ﬁrm ﬁlls additional
positions on higher levels by promoting workers from within.
18 Campion et al. (1994) study these aspects of job rotation empirically.
19 Eriksson and Ortega (2001) ﬁnd limited support for the employer learning hypothesis, but no
favorable evidence for job rotation theories of employee learning and employee motivation in
data from Danish private sector ﬁrms.
20 For obvious reasons we only included observations of workers in this analysis who entered at
least three years before the bankruptcy.
21 Point estimates barely change when the level of education is added to the regression but all
coeﬃcient estimates then become insigniﬁcant.
22 See Dohmen (2003b) for a detailed description of the formal salary system.
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23 The maximum wage in scale 12 can exceed the maximum wage in scale 13 because scale 12
absorbs all recently recruited white-collar employees who have not been assigned to a
particular wage scale yet.
24 There is a high degree of coordination between unions and employer federations in the
Netherlands (see Teulings and Hartog, 1998).
25 Nominal contracts are characteristic for the Dutch labor market.
26 The nature of wage determination and the existence of ﬁxed nominal wage contracts, which
can be adjusted to aggregate conditions, helps solving hold-up problems in the way described
by Teulings and Hartog (1998).
27 Averages are taken over wage contracts active on March 14 of each year.
28 Entry wages are much more variable in higher levels (levels 6 to 8), especially during
downsizing.
29 Diﬀerences pertain to the remarkable fact that the 5th percentile wage in level 3 exceeds the 5th
percentile wage in level 4 in every year during the period of workforce expansion from 1987
until 1991, but not in later years. Since new hires typically start in the left tail of the within-
level wage distribution and since level 4 serves as a port of entry for white-collar workers, the
substantial number of new entrants in level 4 stretches out the left tail of the wage distribution
in level 4 in these years. A similar pattern holds for level 1 wage distribution which is also more
skewed to the right during years of substantial entry.
30 Note that we do not observe wages for those workers in level 8 whose annual wages exceed a
200,000 Dutch guilders, so that the observed wage distribution is truncated.
31 In fact, there is evidence in the data ﬁle description that a letter was sent to workers informing
them about the fact that the highest wage in the job has been reached. Unfortunately, we lack
the information when and to whom such a letter was sent.
32 More than 80% have their wage contract changed within half a year after the upward
transition.
33 Table 9 also discloses that the salary premium upon promotion is very similar during
expansion and downsizing. In fact, Dohmen (2003b) shows that the salary system of the ﬁrm is
not changed over time.
34 These regression results portray the pattern of serial correlation in individual wage growth
well. Yet, we are aware that more sophisticated econometric techniques and estimators could
improve the results along various dimensions, e.g., increase eﬃciency or account for learning
eﬀects (see Farber and Gibbons, 1996).
35 Empirical evidence for this kind of reciprocity is presented by Fehr et al. (1997), while Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) provide a theoretical treatment.
36 Additionally, 1309 contracts have nominal wage cuts because of changes in working hours.
37 Wage drops are due to fewer shifts at ELMO during downsizing, i.e., result from reduced
working hours.
38 If we base our analysis on a yearly panel in which the cross sections are taken on March 14 in
each year, we would observe only 134 nominal wage cuts.
39 Nominal wage freezes are more frequent for workers aﬀected by collective bargaining
agreements.
40 It is not surprising that average tenure increases with job level in Table 13 as it reports average
years of tenure since accession to the ﬁrm and not the average years spent in the job level from
which the worker is promoted, which is obviously smaller for those who have experienced
more than one promotion.
41 Roughly 70% of the entire workforce in the activity ﬁeld ‘‘R&D’’ are employed in these levels.
The number varies somewhat over time.
42 As for vertical job mobility, lateral career paths are no one-way route and ‘‘demotions’’ occur.
43 Secretaries account for 2.2% to 2.5% of the workforce at all times, and 3.7% of all observed
workers have been a secretary at some point in time.
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